เพนเทสต์ต่อเนื่องที่พิสูจน์ทุกสิ่งที่พบ

Summary

The scope granted a standard workspace token for a non-privileged member of tenant 4821. The goal was to establish whether that token can reach data or operations belonging to another tenant.

It can. The token was accepted on a tenant-scoped query for account 4822 with no error and no audit entry, and the admin GraphQL catalogue enumerated persisted operations that a standard session should not see. Signup was then shown to trust a client-supplied tenant_id, which is how a caller reaches an arbitrary tenant in the first place.

What was refused

SQL injection against the catalogue filter was refused — the query is parameterised. A JWT alg:none downgrade was rejected by the verifier. Both are recorded because a run that lists only what worked is describing a demo rather than a target.

Recommended order

1. Derive tenancy server-side at signup and reject client-supplied tenant ids.
2. Scope the token check to the tenant on every read path, not just on writes.
3. Record cross-tenant reads in the audit log so the next attempt is visible.