PENTEST

持续渗透测试，每一条结果都拿得出证据

把它指向一个域名、一个 API，或者一段内网。它按渗透测试员的方式工作：摸清攻击面，尝试攻击，把成功的串起来。扫描器比对特征，然后丢给你一个待分拣的队列。狐狸只报告它真正做成的事，而且做两次：一次用来证明，一次在你发布修复之后。

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评估视图。

一次评估产出的全部都在这里：智能体写的摘要、它证明过的发现，以及背后的活动。报告可以从这里打开，也可以下载成 PDF。

JWT tenant isolation and admin surface validation

Completed4 days ago31 minutes

4Risks1 critical2 high1 medium

ExecutionAutomated

Started4 days ago

Duration31 minutes

Risks4

Credits180

Summary

The scope granted a standard workspace token for a non-privileged member of tenant 4821. The goal was to establish whether that token can reach data or operations belonging to another tenant.

It can. The token was accepted on a tenant-scoped query for account 4822 with no error and no audit entry, and the admin GraphQL catalogue enumerated persisted operations that a standard session should not see. Signup was then shown to trust a client-supplied tenant_id, which is how a caller reaches an arbitrary tenant in the first place.

What was refused

SQL injection against the catalogue filter was refused — the query is parameterised. A JWT alg:none downgrade was rejected by the verifier. Both are recorded because a run that lists only what worked is describing a demo rather than a target.

Recommended order

Derive tenancy server-side at signup and reject client-supplied tenant ids.
Scope the token check to the tenant on every read path, not just on writes.
Record cross-tenant reads in the audit log so the next attempt is visible.